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SAUL ALINSKY AND THE
LITIGATION CAMPAIGN TO WIN THE
RIGHT TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
GERALD N. ROSENBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION: ALINSKY'S UNDERSTANDING OF
HOW TO BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE
Saul Alinsky would be disgusted by the litigation campaign to
win the right to same-sex marriage. This is not because he
opposed same-sex marriage, although he might well have, but
rather because litigation is the antithesis of Alinsky's approach to
bringing about social change. The rally cry of the Back of the
Yards Neighborhood Council, founded by Alinsky and Joseph
Meegan in 1939, was, "[w]e the people will work out our own
destiny,"1 not, "leave it to the lawyers." In the material that
follows, I argue that Alinsky's understanding of the mechanisms
by which social change is made is fundamentally at odds with the
litigation campaign for marriage equality. I argue, further, that
while some gains have been made through litigation, it has set
back the cause of marriage equality for at least a generation. I
conclude by suggesting that litigation to win the right to same-sex
marriage is not unique and that, as Alinksy would likely urge,
litigation on behalf of the disadvantaged rarely, if ever, makes
sense as a strategy for change.
Alinsky believed that making social change requires involving
and empowering people. For Alinsky, change was the product of
"debate and discussion; agendas and bylaws; elected
representatives and collective action."2  That does not happen
when lawyers bring cases. Rather, people are shunted to the side
as lawyers prepare briefs, engage in court proceedings, and focus
questions of fairness and justice in narrow and restrictive legal
language. Courthouses are not typically the venue for the kind of
demonstrations and protests that Alinsky favored. Citizen
engagement in litigation is limited to hearing the occasional talk
about how the case is going: talks that are about what the lawyers
* Associate Professor of Political Science and Lecturer in Law, The University
of Chicago.
1. SANFORD D. HORWITT, LET THEM CALL ME REBEL: SAUL ALINSKY - HIS
LIFE AND LEGACY xiii, 408 (1989).
2. Id. at 109.
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have done for you, not what you have done for yourself. Alinsky's
colleague and organizer, Doug Still, explained Alinsky's approach
this way: "Saul [Alinsky] felt strongly that you don't patronize
people but instead have them experience their own authority and
practice their own power. The assertion of personal value is the
core of his whole philosophy."3 That does not happen when people
are bystanders to litigation.
For Alinsky, the "hero of this glorious undertaking"4 of
making change is the organizer, not the litigator. In his nearly
600-page study of Alinsky's life and work, Horwitt stresses that for
Alinsky, "fundamentally the organizer's goal was to create a
setting in which victimized people could experience and express
their self-worth, power, and dignity."5 This does not happen when
lawyers are bringing cases instead of organizing communities.
Indeed, Horwitt makes no mention of courts or litigation as a
strategy for change that Alinsky supported. The only reference to
litigation is defensive, on how the Alinsky-founded Temporary
Woodlawn Organization ("TWO") responded when slum landlords
went to court to stop rent strikes. Here, Horwitt reports, "[a]ll
TWO wanted was to have friendly judges assigned to these cases-
which well-connected committeemen could arrange-who would
grant postponements to TWO's lawyers. If the postponements
continued more or less indefinitely, TWO's organizers had a good
chance to win their rent strikes." 6
Alinsky was inspired by the confrontational actions and
tactics of John L. Lewis, leader of the militant Congress of
Industrial Organizations ("C.I.O.") in the 1930s, who he called his
"old friend and tutor."7 Alinsky even wrote a biography of Lewis.8
Both Lewis and Alinksy believed that confrontation was essential
to making change. Alinsky "insisted that power-not reason-was
fundamental to the achievement of social change .. . ." Courts, of
course, deal with latter, not the former. And the only
confrontation that occurs in a courtroom is between opposing
lawyers or, perhaps, a lawyer and a single witness.
In 1971 Alinsky published Rules For Radicals: A Practical
Primer for Realistic Radicals.10 His aim was to be the Machiavelli
of the left. As he wrote early in the book, "The Prince was written
by Machiavelli for the Haves on how to hold power. Rules for
3. Id. at 383.
4. Id. at 174.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 404.
7. SAUL D. ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS: A PRACTICAL PRIMER FOR
REALISTIC RADICALS 136 (1971).
8. SAUL ALINSKY, JOHN L. LEWIS, AN UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY (1949).
9. HORWIT, supra note 1, at xv.
10. ALINSKY, supra note 7.
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Radicals is written for the Have-Nots on how to take it away.
'11
Throughout the book, Alinsky stresses that change comes from
power and power comes from mass organizations. His aim is to set
out rules for "how to create mass organizations to seize power and
give it to the people." 12 This is the antithesis of litigation.
In a chapter labeled "Tactics," Alinsky sets out thirteen rules
for successful organizing for change. 13 None of them has anything
remotely to do with litigation. Further, a number of them are at
odds with a litigation strategy for change. For example, Alinsky's
fifth rule is "Ridicule is man's most potent weapon."'4  He
illustrates this rule with examples of poking fun at those in power.
For instance, when trying to organize the poor black community in
Rochester, New York, his response to claims by the then corporate
giant Eastman Kodak company, headquartered in Rochester, that
it had done a great deal to help the community, was to tell the
press, "the only thing Eastman Kodak has done on the race issue
in America has been to introduce color film." 5 Alinsky writes that
the reaction from Kodak was "shock, anger, and resentment ....
They were not being attacked or insulted-they were being
laughed at, and this was insufferable."'16 Courts and judges are
not in the ridicule business, and to the extent that ridicule is a
potent instigator of change, litigation will not contribute to it.
Ridicule, of course, depends on public support to work most
effectively. If the corporate executives of Eastman Kodak, the
white leadership of Rochester, and the white population in general
thought there was nothing unfair about the conditions under
which blacks lived, then Alinsky's comments would have fallen
flat. They might have helped energize the black community, but
with economic and political power so firmly entrenched, that might
not have been sufficient to bring about change. As Alinsky gained
more experience, he came to understand that change required
broad support, be it in organizing particular communities or
pressuring particular industries such as grape growers through
the successful national grape boycott led by Cesar Chavez, an
Alinsky student.17 In the last chapter of Rules for Radicals,
appropriately titled, "The Way Ahead," Alinsky makes this point
explicit. He writes, "even if all the low-income parts of our
population were organized... it would not be powerful enough to
get ... needed changes."1 8
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 127-30 (listing the thirteen rules).
14. ALINSKY, supra note 7, at 128.
15. ALINSKY, supra note 7, at 137.
16. Id.
17. HORWITT, supra note 1, at 533.
18. ALINSKY, supra note 7, at 184.
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Alinsky's sixth rule is that a "good tactic is one that your
people enjoy." 19 Mass protests can be exciting and fun in a way
that litigation can never be. Litigation, by its very nature, is
narrow, focused, and dry. For example, Alinsky describes an
action to force a downtown Chicago department store to hire more
African-Americans. Rather than bring a lawsuit, Alinsky laid
plans to bring three thousand well-dressed, well-mannered,
African-Americans into the store on a busy Saturday shopping
day. They would fill the store, from the aisles to the counters to
the dressing rooms. It would have been a lot of fun.20 Before the
day came, however, the plan was purposely leaked to the
department store. Alinsky was contacted with an "urgent request"
to meet with store executives before the Saturday in question.
Alinsky reports that the store's personnel policies were "drastically
changed," and 186 new jobs were created. "For the first time,"
Alinsky writes, "blacks were on the sales floor and in executive
training."21 The planned shopping day was called off.
Alinsky's seventh rule is one he "cannot repeat too often."22 It
is that a "tactic that drags on too long becomes a drag."23 He
credits this to human nature. Litigation, by its very nature, is
slow. It can take years for cases to be heard, decided, and
appealed. Legal challenges virtually guarantee that litigation will
drag on. If change comes from mass movements, and if keeping
participants energized and involved is an ongoing challenge, then
litigation is likely to undercut change organizations.
There are many examples of Alinsky's strategy in action, such
as the department store protest noted above, that highlight these
points. They are the antithesis of litigation. Horwitt writes of a
"quintessentially Alinsky" tactic to "pressure slum landlords...
who refused to repair heating systems or broken water pipes." 24
Rather than filing a lawsuit, TWO set up picket lines. But
"instead of picketing in front of the slum building in Woodlawn," 25
Alinsky writes that TWO "selected its blackest blacks and bused
them out to the lily-white suburb of the slum landlord's
residence."26  The point was to enrage the landlord's white
neighbors to such an extent that they would pressure the landlord
to make repairs. 27
19. Id. at 128.
20. Id. at 146-48.
21. Id. at 148.
22. Id. at 159.
23. Id. at 128.
24. HORWITT, supra note 1, at 406-07.
25. Id. at 407.
26. ALINSKY, supra note 7, at 144.
27. Id.
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Similarly, in order to pressure banks to reveal the names of
slum landlords, Alinsky did not bring a lawsuit. Rather, TWO
threatened to send black people into banks in very large numbers
to open very small bank accounts. 28 The idea was to tie up the
banks for several days, scaring off white customers and bringing
operations to a halt. If this tactic failed to force the banks to
reveal the names, the new customers would return and close their
accounts, again creating havoc.
These and similar examples 29 underscore how different
Alinksy's tactics for bringing change are from litigation. They
involve public protests, not private court cases; they involve
thousands of ordinary people, not just a few lawyers; and they are
about people acting to empower themselves, not a handful of
lawyers claiming power on their behalf. They target specific
individuals, not general laws and practices. 30  They disrupt
everyday practices and involve shock and ridicule. Perhaps most
importantly, they are premised on the belief that for change to
occur it is the disadvantaged themselves who must organize and
act to demand it. Real change involves ordinary people taking
their rights, not top-down pronouncements of rights from judges.
Although the language is a bit awkward, Alinsky approvingly
quotes Finley Peter Dunne's Mr. Dooley's advice: "[d]on't ask fr
rights. Take thim. An' don't let anny wan give thim to ye. A right
that is handed to ye fer nawthin has somethin the mather with it.
It's more thin likely it's only a wrrong turned inside out [sic]." 31
For Alinsky, then, there were rules for radicals who wished to
extend benefits to those to whom they were denied. As he put it,
"there are certain central concepts of action in human politics that
operate regardless of the scene or the time."32  With this
background, I turn now to the litigation movement for same-sex
marriage.
28. ALINSKY, supra note 7, at 162-63; HORWITT, supra note 1, at 407-08.
29. One example involves mass protests to create pressure on the
Superintendent of the Chicago public schools to release school enrollment
statistics. HORWITT, supra note 1, at 405-06. Another Alinsky tactic was
threatening a "shit-in" at O'Hare airport (taking over all of the bathroom stalls
and urinals) to force the city of Chicago to honor commitments made to TWO.
ALINSKY, supra note 7, at 142-44. Finally, students would deposit wads of
chewed gum all over campus to pressure college officials to loosen rules. Id. at
145-46.
30. Alinsky underscores this point, writing that the "important point in the
choosing of a target is that it must be a personification, not something general
and abstract such as a community's segregated practices." ALINSKY, supra
note 7, at 133.
31. ALINSKY, supra note 7, at 124.
32. ALINSKY, supra note 7, at xviii.
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II. LITIGATION TO WIN THE RIGHT TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Gays are a small minority in the U.S. who have suffered from,
and continues to suffer from, discrimination. One area in which
gay men and lesbians have been treated differently than and
unequally from heterosexuals is marriage. Put simply, throughout
American history, heterosexuals have been expected and
encouraged to marry while gay men and lesbians have been
prohibited from marrying. To many people, this unequal
treatment denies gays equality, treating them as second-class
citizens. Thus, for at least some members of the gay community,
marriage equality is a long-standing goal.
The campaign for marriage equality between heterosexuals
and gay men and lesbians has been waged largely in the courts.
On the one hand, this seems sensible since until the first decade of
the twenty-first century there were no legislatures that could be
considered even remotely likely to extend marriage to gay men
and lesbians. With the legislative route to social change blocked,
same-sex marriage proponents turned to the courts. Several cases
were brought in the 1970s but to no avail.3 3 On the other hand,
from an Alinsky perspective, litigating to win the right to same-sex
marriage appears to violate many of his rules for radicals. In
particular, it doesn't involve members of the gay community who
are spectators rather than participants in litigation. It is an elite,
top-down strategy for change based on legal reasoning, not
political power. In addition, it takes a great deal of time, not
making it conducive to movement building. Importantly, it offers
the promise of victory without the political support necessary to
make judicial victory a political reality. An Alinsky framework
suggests that litigation to win the right to same-sex marriage
would be unlikely to succeed, even if court cases were won.
The fortunes of same-sex marriage litigators turned in 1993.
That year, in Baehr v. Lewin,34 the Hawaii Supreme Court held
that Hawaii's denial of marriage licenses to gay men and lesbians,
absent a compelling justification, violated the State Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. In order to defend the
law, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the state needed to
demonstrate to the trial court on remand that the marriage
33. Losing suits were brought in Minnesota, Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d
185 (Minn. 1971), Kentucky, Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973),
and Washington, Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). A
similar fate met a case argued in 1993 in the courts of the District of
Columbia, Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995). Same-sex
marriage was also implicated in cases dealing with immigration status in
Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980) and divorce of an
asserted common-law marriage in De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa.
Super. 1984).
34. 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
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statute "is justified by compelling state interests and ... is
narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of the
applicant couples' constitutional rights."35 In 1996, the trial court
held in Baehr v. Miike36 that the state had failed to meet this
burden and ordered the state to issue marriage licenses to same-
sex couples.
At first blush, the court victory in Hawaii appears to
repudiate Alinsky's arguments. Evan Wolfson, co-counsel in the
case, as well as others, argued that in order to comply with the
Full Faith and Credit Clause 37 of the U.S. Constitution, other
states would be required to recognize same-sex marriages
performed in Hawaii.3 8 Celebrating the victory, Wolfson wrote
that Baehr v. Lewin (1993) was "nothing less than a tectonic shift,
a fundamental realignment of the landscape, possibly the biggest
lesbian and gay rights legal victory ever," a breakthrough case
that most might see as gay people's Loving v. Virginia.39 If
Wolfson was right, then litigation to win the right to same-sex
marriage was a brilliant strategic move.40
In 1999, same-sex marriage proponents in Vermont also made
headway. In Baker v. State,4 1 the Vermont Supreme Court held
that the state's refusal to issue marriage licenses to gay men and
lesbians violated the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont
Constitution.42 To remedy the violation, the Court turned to the
35. Id.
36. No. 91-1394-05, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
37. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.
38. Koppelman labels this claim a "fundamental misconception," noting
that states have "always had the power to decline to recognize marriages from
other states, and they have been exercising that power for centuries."
ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX
MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES 117-18 (2006).
39. Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights For
Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 567, 572 (1994). In a seminal 1967 case, the United States
Supreme Court held that anti-miscegenation laws (laws prohibiting inter-
racial marriage) were unconstitutional. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967).
40. But see infra note 108 and accompanying text (finding that no marriage
licenses were ever issued to same-sex couples because Hawaii voters amended
the state Constitution to give the legislature the authority to limit marriage to
heterosexuals, which the legislature promptly did).
41. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
42. The Common Benefits Clause reads: "That government is, or ought to
be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people,
nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of
any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that
community." VT. CONST., ch. I, art. 7.
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state legislature, affording it a limited time to act. The Court held
that as long as the legislature created a status that granted gays
"all or most of the same rights and obligations provided by the law
to married partners," such as a "domestic partnership" or
"registered partnership" arrangement, the Vermont Constitution
would be satisfied. 43 The legislature acted in April of 2000,
passing legislation granting gay men and lesbians the right to
form civil unions.44  Although Vermont civil unions are not
marriage, they grant same-sex couples "all the same benefits,
protections and responsibilities under law... as are granted to
spouses in a marriage. '45
On November 18, 2003, same-sex marriage litigators won
their biggest victory then to date. In Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health,46 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
that Massachusetts could not "deny the protections, benefits and
obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the
same sex who wish to marry."47 The Court gave the legislature
180 days to change the law.48 After much wrangling,49 the
legislature complied; on May 17, 2004, the fiftieth anniversary of
Brown v. Board of Education,50 the first same-sex marriages were
legally performed in the United States.
Change has also occurred in at least seven other states since
the Goodridge decision. The states of New Jersey51 and New
Hampshire52 adopted civil unions. New Jersey acted in response
to a decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court ordering the
legislature to guarantee gay men and lesbians marriage rights. 53
Interestingly, New Hampshire acted without judicial pressure.
Connecticut also adopted civil unions,54 acting without judicial
pressure. That status, however, did not last long. In October of
43. Baker, 744 A.2d at 886.
44. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 344-47 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the events in
Vermont leading up to the enactment of the civil unions law).
45. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (1999).
46. 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).
47. Id. at 312.
48. Id. at 344.
49. See DANIEL R. PINELLO, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE 33-72 (2006) (discussing the political machinations involved).
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. NPR, State by State: The Legal Battle Over Gay Marriage, Apr. 16,
2009, http://www.npr.org/news/specials/gaymarriage/map/index.html
[hereinafter NPR State by State].
52. Josh Rogers, New Hampshire Approves Gay Civil Unions, National
Public Radio (NPR), Apr. 26, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story
.php?storyId=9852764.
53. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006).
54. See NPR State by State, supra note 51 (reporting that Connecticut
legalized same-sex civil unions in April, 2005).
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2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court struck down the state's civil
union law, holding that same-sex couples have a constitutional
right to marry.55
In addition to civil unions and marriages, five other states
and the District of Columbia have expanded the rights offered to
same-sex couples. In the states of Maine and Washington as well
as in the District of Columbia, same-sex couples are offered at
least some of the same rights that accrue to married heterosexual
couples. 56 Oregon has gone further, offering same-sex couples the
right to enter into contractual relationships that grant them the
same benefits that state law offers to married couples. 57 And then,
there is California. Starting in 1999, the legislature enacted three
progressively broader measures extending rights to same-sex
couples. 58  The last measure permitted same-sex couples (and
some opposite-sex couples over the age of sixty-two) to register as
domestic partners and receive all of the state-level rights and
responsibilities of marriage.5 9 But California's ban on same-sex
marriage was invalidated by the California Supreme Court in May
2008,60 and as of June 2008, same-sex couples were granted
marriage equality. 61 However, in the 2008 election, the voters of
California enacted Proposition 8, amending the California
Constitution to limit marriage to heterosexual couples.62 The
California Supreme Court heard a constitutional challenge to the
55. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008).
56. Nat'l Conf. of St. Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and
Domestic Partnerships, Apr. 2009, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyflsamesex.
htm [hereinafter NCSL Overview]. See also NPR State by State, supra note 51
(listing the status of same-sex couples' rights in each state).
57. NPR State by State, supra note 51; NCSL Overview, supra note 56.
58. See Enrique A. Monagas, California's Assembly Bill 205, The Domestic
Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003: Is Domestic Partner
Legislation Compromising the Campaign for Marriage Equality, 17 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 44 (2006) (outlining the legislative measures California took
in extending rights to same-sex couples).
59. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-297.5 (West 2003). However, on March 7, 2000,
California voters approved Proposition 22 (the "Knight Initiative"), amending
the Family Code to state: "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is
valid and recognized in California." Toni Broaddus, Vote No If You Believe in
Marriage: Lessons from the No on Knight/No on Proposition 22 Campaign, 15
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1 (2000). The Proposition was approved with
sixty-one percent of the votes and carried fifty-two of fifty-eight counties, only
falling short in six counties in the San Francisco Bay area. California 2000
Primary Election Proposition 22 - Limit on Marriage, California Secretary of
State, http:l/primary2000.sos.ca.gov/returnslprop/mapRO22.htm (last visited
Apr. 29, 2009).
60. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008).
61. NPR State By State, supra note 51.
62. Jessica Garrison, Cara Mia DiMassa & Richard C. Paddock, Voters
Approve Proposition 8 Banning Same-Sex Marriages, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008,
at Al.
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proposition in early March 2009 and, by a vote of 6-1, upheld it.63
What would Alinsky make of these actions? On the one hand,
prior to litigation, no state provided same-sex couples anything
remotely equivalent to marriage rights. In the years since the
Hawaii litigation, however, eleven states and the District of
Columbia have changed their laws to provide either same-sex
marriage (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire
and Iowa), civil unions (New Jersey), domestic partnerships that
grant all the rights of marriage (California, Oregon), or limited
domestic partner benefits (Hawaii, Maine, Washington, District of
Columbia). 64 The granting of these benefits, it could be argued, is
a step forward. Same-sex couples have been granted rights
ranging from hospital visitation and medical decision-making to
health care coverage to inheritance when a partner dies without a
will. On this characterization, litigation for same-sex marriage
has had important, positive effects.
On the other hand, marriage equality has not been achieved.
Even in Massachusetts and Connecticut (and California briefly),
where state law provides identical treatment and the name
"marriage," same-sex couples are denied over one thousand one
hundred federal rights that accompany marriage.65 Same-sex
couples are not even separate but equal; rather, they are separate
and unequal. As for civil unions, Steven Goldstein, director of
Garden State Equality, a New Jersey gay-rights advocacy group,
understands them in true Alinsky fashion: "Civil unions are
nothing like marriage... The cockamamie contraption simply
doesn't work. If civil unions were a person, they would be arrested
for fraud."66  Indeed, Lambda Legal, a self-described "impact
litigation" group that has been involved in same-sex marriage
litigation, argues that civil unions are profoundly "discriminatory"
for a host of reasons.67 Overall, then, while progress has been
made, marriage equality has not been achieved.
If this were the whole story, Alinsky might still see it as a
good start. Although he would worry about the lack of active
63. Maura Dolan, California Supreme Court Looks Unlikely to Kill
Proposition 8, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009, at Al; Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48
(Cal. 2009).
64. See NPR State by State, supra note 51 (mapping the state of same-sex
couples rights state by state; NCSL Overview, supra note 56 (reporting the
status of same-sex couples' rights).
65. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (reporting the results of a
U.S. General Accounting Office report).
66. Christine Vestal, Civil Unions Spread, but Gays Want to Wed,
STATELINE.ORG, May 31, 2007, http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?con
tentld=212354.
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involvement in litigation on the part of gay men and lesbians,
Alinsky was at base a pragmatist. As a believer in creative public
protests, he understood their limits also. For example, he relates a
meeting with the head of a corporation who proudly showed him
blueprints for a new plant. Much to Alinsky's chagrin, the
blueprints included a self-described "sit-in" room where protesters
would be offered coffee, television, clean rest rooms, and plenty of
room. If others were to follow this example, Alinsky mused, "you
can relegate sit-ins to the Smithsonian Museum." 68 What Alinsky
wanted was results. As he wrote early in Rules for Radicals, the
"man of action views the issue of means and ends in pragmatic and
strategic terms."69  So perhaps same-sex marriage proponents
made the correct strategic and pragmatic decision to litigate. But
this is not the whole story. When that story is told, as Alinsky
might expect, the decision to litigate turns out to be deeply flawed.
III. NOT LISTENING TO ALINSKY:
THE WRONG TACTIC AT THE WRONG TIME
Alinsky's core belief, as I have noted, was that people
themselves need to feel and become empowered. Because
litigation is an elite, top-down activity, it appears to be the
antithesis of community organizing. But perhaps litigation is
capable of creating a sense of empowerment by sparking political
mobilization. In his study of the movement for pay equity,
McCann argues that this might be the case. Litigation, McCann
suggests, by providing a forum for protest and a language for
grievances, can lead to "building a movement, generating public
support for new rights claims, and providing leverage to
supplement other political tactics." 70 Perhaps, then, the decisions
in Baehr, Baker, and Goodridge, sparked mobilization across the
country in favor of same-sex marriage. There is some evidence that
supports this possibility.
One piece of evidence comes from the exuberant crowds that
turned out in Massachusetts to witness and support the first
same-sex marriages. In Boston, 10,000 people gathered outside of
City Hall to witness the issuance of the first marriage license to a
same-sex couple.7 1 The City of Cambridge opened its City Hall
just after midnight on May 17th to accept marriage license
applications.7 2 The historic event was preceded by a celebration
with wedding cake and sparkling cider presided over by
68. ALINSKY, supra note 7, at 163.
69. Id. at 24.
70. MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 10 (1994).
71. Yvonne Abraham & Rick Klein, Free to Marry; Historic Date Arrives for
Same-Sex Couples in Massachusetts, BOSTON GLOBE, May 17, 2004, at Al.
72. Id.
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Cambridge's Mayor. 73 In the words of the first person to apply for
a marriage license for herself and her partner, "[this is like
winning the World Series and the Stanley Cup on the same day. '74
Additional evidence supporting the role of litigation in
spurring mobilization comes from actions taken by local officials in
San Francisco, Sandoval County, New Mexico, New Paltz, New
York, and Portland, Oregon. Despite the fact that marriages are
regulated by state law, on February 12, 2004, not quite three
months after the Goodridge decision, the city of San Francisco
began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.7 5  San
Francisco has a large gay population and the actions of Mayor
Gavin Newsom were met with euphoria. Same-sex couples lined
up for hours outside of the city clerk's office to apply for marriage
licenses. A sympathetic city attorney described the scene this way:
The atmosphere was one of elation and love and pride as people
were going into the Clerk's office, after standing for many hours in
line .... every time a couple came out of the Clerk's office with a
license, people cheered. It was just an absolutely amazing
experience .... I literally got chills every time I walked down that
hallway. It was like nothing else I've ever experienced. 76
From February 12th until March lth, when the California
Supreme Court issued an injunction ordering the city to stop
issuing the licenses, San Francisco issued 4,037 marriage licenses
to same-sex couples. 77
In the wake of Mayor Newsom's actions, a few other local
officials took similar steps. In Sandoval county, New Mexico,
Victoria Dunlap, the county clerk, issued sixty-four marriage
licenses to same-sex couples before the New Mexico Attorney
General issued an opinion holding that the licenses were invalid
under state law.7 8 In late February, the twenty-seven-year-old
mayor of New Paltz, New York, seventy-five miles North of New
York City, began performing marriages for same-sex couples. 7 9
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Carolyn Marshall, Dozens of Gay Couples Marry in San Francisco
Ceremonies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A24.
76. PINELLO, supra note 49, at 81.
77. Dean E. Murphy, San Francisco Married 4,037 Same-Sex Pairs from 46
States, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004, at A26. However, on August 12, 2004 the
California Supreme Court unanimously held that San Francisco exceeded its
authority and violated state law in issuing the marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 472 (Cal.
2004). The Court also held, by a five to two vote, that the same-sex marriages
performed were void. Id.
78. PINELLO, supra note 49, at 19; see id. at 1-17 (discussing her
motivations and the events of that day).
79. See id. (noting that Mayor West officiated twenty-four same-sex
weddings).
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When Mayor West was banned by court order from continuing to
perform same-sex marriages, others stepped in, including six
Unitarian Universalist ministers and the Deputy Mayor.8 0
Overall, by mid-September of 2004, more than 200 marriages of
same-sex couples had been performed.8 1
Similar actions were taken in Portland, Oregon.8 2 Starting on
March 3, 2004, Multnomah County, Oregon, began issuing
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.8 3 By the time the county
was ordered by a judge to stop on April 20, 2004, it had issued
3,022 marriage licenses to same-sex couples.8 4
This brief presentation of the events in the few months
following the Goodridge decision suggests that the judicial victory
mobilized a few elected officials to issue marriage licenses to same-
sex couples. It also suggests that litigation mobilized many same-
sex couples. In his moving study of these events, Pinello concludes
that "Goodridge brought about enormous social change" and "had
a profound inspirational effect for the marriage movement, among
elites and the grass roots . . .5 Pinello argues that "the same-
sex weddings in San Francisco, Portland, and elsewhere would not
have occurred without the example of Goodridge."86 Indeed, he
argues that "Goodridge radicalized and coalesced the gay
community like no other event since the advent of AIDS in the
1980s."87
One result of this mobilization may be the successful efforts
in a few other states, either judicial or legislative, to win the right
to same-sex marriage. As noted above, in the years since
Goodridge, a number of states acted to extend benefits to same-sex
couples. It may well be that same-sex marriage supporters were
mobilized by the apparent success of Goodridge to press on with
their cause.
Alinksy, I think, would be skeptical that these claims, even if
correct, justified litigation as the right strategic choice to win the
right to same-sex marriage. This is largely because the litigation
strategy does not appear to have led to the building of a mass
same-sex marriage organization. "Change," he wrote, "comes from
80. Gabriel J. Wasserman, West Barred from Gay Vows, POUGHKEEPSIE
JOURNAL, June 8, 2004, at IA; Robert Sullivan, Mayor with a Mission, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at 638.
81. Judge Won't Nullify Gay Marriages, POUGHKEEPSIE JOURNAL, Sept. 17,
2004, at 1A.
82. See PINELLO, supra note 49, at 102-42 (discussing these and subsequent
events in Oregon).
83. Id.
84. Id. As in California, the Oregon Supreme Court nullified the purported
marriages. Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 102 (Or. 2005).
85. PINELLO, supra note 49, at 192.
86. Id.
A7. Id. at 193.
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power, and power comes from organization."8 8  Where, Alinsky
might ask, is the organizational movement, the grassroots about
which Pinello so eloquently writes? While there are, of course,
established gay rights groups such as Lambda Legal,8 9 Gay &
Lesbian Advocates & Defenders ("GLAAD"),90 and the Human
Rights Campaign ("HRC"),91 they are elite-based groups that have
approached same-sex marriage through litigation. They have
rarely engaged in the kind of public protests around marriage
equality that build mass organizations. Where there has been
mobilization and mass protest, as around Proposition 8 in
California, it has been episodic, reactive, and defensive.
But what about the actions of Mayor Newsom? Were not they
the kind of creative, in-your-face, public protests that Alinsky
supported? Did not they highlight the profound unfairness of
denying loving couples the dignity, let alone the legal benefits, of
marriage? The answer to these questions is no. Same-sex
marriage litigators and their local government allies have made an
enormous tactical blunder that has set back their goal of marriage
equality for at least a generation. I turn now to showing why.
Saul Alinsky was a pragmatist. He analyzed the world from
the vantage point of cold, hard, calculation. He was not under the
spell of the romance of rights that so consumes most lawyers who
seek change. He understood that pronouncements of rights were
worthless without the political power necessary to implement
them. "We must first see the world as it is and not as we would
like it to be," he wrote. 92 Thus, he understood at a fundamental
level that no change could succeed without broad public support.
In trying to organize poor people he advised that "[t]actics must
begin with the experience of the middle class."93 Without broad
support, attempts at change would backfire. Speaking of the
violent anti-Vietnam war group the Weathermen, Alinsky said,
"[t]he worst form of social treason is to stir up a reaction that is
more damaging to you than to your enemy. The Weathermen
should be getting paid by the extreme right for the work they
do."94 Stirring up a reaction that is more damaging to you than to
your enemy is precisely what same-sex marriage litigators did.
88. ALINSKY, supra note 7, at 113.
89. About Lambda Legal, http://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us/ (last visited
Apr. 29, 2009).
90. GLAAD Mission Statement, http://www.glaad.orglPage.aspx?pid=269
(last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
91. About HRC, http://www.hrc.org/about_us/index.htm (last visited Apr.
29, 2009).
92. ALINSKY, supra note 7, at 12.
93. Id. at 195.
94. HORWITT, supra note 1, at 528.
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Judicial victories in favor of same-sex marriage and public
attempts to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples in San
Francisco and several other places, created a backlash of enormous
proportions. As the Hawaii litigation unfolded in the 1990s,
opponents of same-sex marriage adopted the claims of proponents,
warning that if Hawaii granted gay men and lesbians the right to
marry, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution
might require the recognition of such marriages in other states.95
This concern was heightened by the Goodridge decision in
November of 2003, legalizing same-sex marriage in
Massachusetts. 96  Tim Nashif, a founder and director of the
Oregon Family Council that opposed same-sex marriage, explained
the fear of same-sex marriage opponents:
Massachusetts was on the verge of legalizing same-sex marriage,
not through the people but through the courts. So the question
came up, if Massachusetts legalizes same-sex marriage, how do we
deal with the fact that [gay and lesbian] Oregonians may be able to
go to Massachusetts, get married, come back to Oregon, and then we
have a situation in Oregon where there's this debate about whether
these marriages should be recognized. 97
As early as the Hawaii litigation, and given increasing
urgency by the Vermont and Massachusetts judicial victories,
opponents of same-sex marriage around the country began to
organize. Their aim was to enact laws, on both the state and
federal level, defining marriage in purely heterosexual terms as a
union between one man and one woman and refusing to recognize
out-of-state marriages between same-sex couples. These efforts
proved extraordinarily successful.
On the federal level, opponents of same-sex marriage
responded to the Hawaii litigation by enacting the "Defense of
Marriage Act" ("DOMA") in 1996. 98 DOMA defines marriage as
"only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife" and acknowledges the right of each state to refuse
recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages despite the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. 99 Introduced in an
election year, DOMA passed the House and Senate by
extraordinary majorities. In the House the margin was better
than five to one (342-67), and in the Senate it was better than six
95. But see KOPPELMAN, supra note 38, at 118 (noting that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not require recognition of same-sex marriages from
other states). The claim was made repeatedly, however, either sincerely
(although mistakenly) or as a rhetorical device to mobilize opponents.
96. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 312.
97. PINELLO, supra note 49, at 107-08.
98. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419
(1996).
99 ILd.
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to one (85-14).100 As a result of the passage of DOMA, same-sex
couples are denied all federal benefits that come with marriage. 0 1
They range from social security and tax benefits to housing and
food stamps to employment benefits to inheritance. 102 In a 2004
report, the Government Accounting Office ("GAO") found that
there were 1,138 federal statutory provisions in which benefits,
rights, and privileges involved marital status and were thus
inapplicable to same-sex couples. 10 3
The passage of DOMA was just the beginning of the
conservative backlash against same-sex marriage. On the state
level, opponents of same-sex marriage mobilized to a virtually
unprecedented degree, raising money across the country and
lobbying state legislature to pass laws banning same-sex
marriage. As of the end of 2008, all but six states-Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode
Island-had enacted laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. 104
Forty-one states in addition to the federal government have so-
called "Defense of Marriage Acts," prohibiting same-sex marriages
or the recognition of same-sex marriages formed in another
jurisdiction. 105 Only three of those states had such language in
their statute books before the Hawaii decision in 1996.106
There has also been mass conservative mobilization aimed at
amending state constitutions to define marriage in heterosexual
terms. 10 7 A large majority of states has considered amending their
constitutions to ban same-sex marriage, and a majority has so
acted. Hawaii was the first state to act, amending its Constitution
in 1998 in the wake of the Baehr litigation, reserving the issue of
same-sex marriage for legislative determination. 0 8 Alaska banned
100. DOMAwatch.org, Federal Defense of Marriage Act,
http://www.domawatch.org/about/federaldoma.html (last visited on Sept. 2,
2009). DOMA Watch supports limiting marriage to heterosexuals.
101. Patricia G. Miller, No Faith or Credit? Refusal to Recognize Same-Sex
Marriages in Another State Could Mean Problems, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Dec.
21, 1996, at All.
102. Id.
103. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF
MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT 1 (2004), available at
http:lwww.gao.govlnew.itemsldO4353r.pdf.
104. NCSL Overview, supra note 56. Four states-California, Nebraska,
Nevada, and Oregon-have constitutional amendments limiting marriage to
heterosexuals but no statutory law. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. There was also an attempt to amend the U.S. Constitution to prohibit
same-sex marriage. However, it fell well short of the constitutionally required
two-thirds vote in each House of Congress in order to be sent to the states for
ratification. See ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at 365-67 (explaining the attempt
to amend the U.S. Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage).
108. NCSL Overview, supra note 56.
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same-sex marriage by constitutional amendment in 1998,109 and
Nebraska did so in 2000.110 In 2002, Nevada limited marriage to
heterosexuals. 11' In the summer of 2004, Missouri and Louisiana
voters overwhelmingly approved constitutional amendments,
recognizing marriage only as between one man and one woman,
with support from nearly seventy-one percent of Missouri voters112
and eighty percent of voters in Louisiana. 113 These five states
were just the tip of the iceberg.
In the 2004 general election, mobilized opponents of same-sex
marriage succeeded in placing constitutional amendments banning
it on the ballot in eleven states, ranging from Mississippi to
Michigan and Oregon to Ohio. 114 In eight of these states (all
except Mississippi, Montana, and Oregon), the amendments could
be read to ban civil unions as well. 115 These eleven states were
home to almost one-fifth of the electorate. 116 On election day in
2004, all the amendments were adopted, and almost all by
lopsided majorities." 7 Only in Oregon (58.8%) and Michigan
(58.6%) was support for the amendments below sixty percent and
in more than half of the states support was over seventy
percent."68
It appears that the Goodridge decision played an important
109. NPR State by State, supra note 51; DOMA Watch, Issues by State -
Alaska, http://www.domawatch.org/stateissues/alaska/index.html (last visited
Apr. 29, 2009).
110. NPR State by State, supra note 51; DOMA Watch, Issues by State -
Nebraska, http://www.domawatch.org/stateissues/nebraska/index.html (last
visited Apr. 29, 2009).
111. NPR State by State, supra note 51; DOMA Watch, Issues by State -
Nevada, http://www.domawatch.org/stateissues/nevada/index.html (last
visited Apr. 29, 2009).
112. Kere Abraham, Define and Conquer: What's Driving the Divisive
Measure 36?, EUGENE WKLY, Vol. XXIII, Issue 39, Sept. 30, 2004, at 14; see
also Monica Davey, Missourians Back Amendment Barring Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/04/
us/missourians-back-amendment-barring-gay-marriage.html; Gay-Marriage




114. See Nat'l Conf. of St. Legislatures, Same-Sex Marriage Measures on the
2004 Ballot, Nov. 17, 2004, http:l/www.ncsl.orglprograms/legismgtlstatevote
/marriage-mea.htm [hereinafter NCSL 2004 Ballot] (listing the seven other
states that had a constitutional amendment on their ballot: Arkansas,
Georgia, Kentucky, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Utah).
115. Id.
116. See July 1, 2004, U.S. Census Bureau Population Data,
http://www.census.gov/populationwww/ (providing statistics which allow the
calculation to be performed).
117. See NCSL 2004 Ballot, supra note 114 (listing the percent of voters
approving the measure in each state).
118. Id.
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role in mobilizing same-sex marriage opponents to amend state
constitutions. For example, the Ohio amendment was put on the
ballot as a direct response to the Goodridge decision. On May 18,
2004, the day after the first same-sex marriages were performed in
Massachusetts, Phil Burress organized a meeting of a conservative
group, Citizens for Community Values, to consider how to make
sure that same-sex marriage would not become legal in Ohio.119
Stating that he was "[s]hocked by scenes from the Bay State,"
Burress and his group decided to propose and support an
amendment to the Ohio Constitution banning same-sex
marriage. 120 "We would not have had this on the ballot if they had
not started marrying people on May 17," Burress said. 121
Flushed with success, opponents of same-sex marriage
continued to mobilize to amend constitutions to ban it. Kansas
and Texas approved constitutional amendments in 2005,122 and
Alabama acted in early 2006.123 On election day in 2006, eight
states had such amendments on the ballot and seven were
approved. 124 For the first time, however, a proposed amendment
was defeated, albeit barely (fifty-one percent to forty-nine percent),
in the state of Arizona. 125 But that was reversed in 2008 when
voters in Arizona, as well as in California and Florida, adopted
constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage. 126
Thus, as of the end of 2008, thirty states, home to 63.9% of the
U.S. population, prohibit same-sex marriage by constitution. 127 In
addition, in at least eighteen of those states the constitutional
amendments can be read to prohibit civil unions or domestic
partnerships as well. 128
119. Scott S. Greenberger, Gay Marriage Ruling Pushed Voters: Mobilized
Bush, Left Kerry Wary, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 17, 2004, at B1.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Nat'l Conf. of St. Legislatures, Timeline-Same Sex Marriages,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesextime.htm [hereinafter NCSL
Timeline] (last visited Apr. 29, 2009); NPR State By State, supra note 51.
123. NCSL Timeline, supra note 122.
124. See Nat'l Conf. of St. Legislatures, Same-Sex Marriage Issues on the
2006 Ballot, Nov. 12, 2006, http://www.ncsl.org/statevote/samesex_06.htm
(listing the states with such amendments on their ballots: Colorado, Idaho,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
125. Id.
126. NCSL Overview, supra note 56.
127. See July 1, 2008, U.S. Census Bureau Population Data,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/ (providing statistics which allow the
calculation to be performed). This count includes Hawaii, whose Constitution
gives the state legislature the power to "reserve marriage to opposite-sex
couples." See NCSL Overview, supra note 56. As noted, the Hawaii
legislature did so act. Id.
128. See NCSL Overview, supra note 56 (listing Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and
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There is also evidence that the presence of constitutional
amendments banning same-sex marriage on the 2004 ballot in
eleven states was a factor in re-electing President Bush. 129 This is
particularly the case in Ohio where, if Senator Kerry had
prevailed, he would have been elected President, albeit while
losing the popular vote nationwide. Phil Burress, the instigator of
the Ohio constitutional amendment, believes that it attracted
people to the polls who also voted for President Bush. "The
Massachusetts Supreme Court cost Kerry the election," Burress
said.130 "If we had not been on the ballot, Bush would not have won
Ohio."131
Phil Burress was not alone in believing that same-sex
marriage litigators' greatest victory furthered the re-election of
President Bush. Robert Knight, director of the Culture & Family
Institute and an opponent of same-sex marriage, saw it as the
"great iceberg" in the election.1 32 "A lot of analysts saw the tip but
didn't understand the power of the mass underneath. It
galvanized millions of Christians to turn out and vote, and George
Bush and the GOP got the lion's share of that vote."'13 3 Perhaps
tongue-in-cheek, Knight said that President Bush should send a
bouquet to Margaret H. Marshall, the chief justice of the
Massachusetts court and the author of the Goodridge decision,
because she "did more than any other single person to assure his
victory." 34
Presidential advisor Karl Rove, widely considered a brilliant
political strategist, reached a similar conclusion. He told reporters
in post-election interviews that opposition to same-sex marriage
was among the most powerful forces in American politics. 35 As
Rove saw the 2004 election, the legalization of same-sex marriage
in Massachusetts had "captured and colored the national
imagination" throughout the country. 136  A New York Times
reporter who interviewed him wrote that he "appeared to stifle a
grin when asked whether he was 'indebted' to Mayor Gavin
Newsom of San Francisco, who opened his City Hall to gay
Wisconsin).
129. See ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at 369-82 (discussing this evidence).
130. Dan Ring, No Backlash in Mass.: Offical May End Effort to Ban Gay
Marriages, THE REPUBLICAN (Springfield, MA), Nov. 5, 2004, at A01.
131. Id.
132. Carolyn Lochhead, Gay Marriage: Did Issue Help Re-Elect Bush?, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 4, 2004, at Al.
133. Id.
134. Alan Cooperman, Same-Sex Bans Fuel Conservative Agenda, WASH.
POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at A39, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dynlarticles/A23672-2004Nov3.html.
135. ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at 369.
136. Jeff Zeleny, Rove: Marriage Issue and Role of Money Were Big, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 10, 2004, at 12.
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marriages until he was blocked by a court, and to the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, for ruling that gay couples have a
right to marriage."1 37
In litigating for same-sex marriage, litigators committed what
Alinsky called "[t]he worst form of social treason... stir[ring] up a
reaction that is more damaging to you than to your enemy." 138
Enamored by the romance of rights, they fundamentally
misunderstood the politics of power. By bringing court cases
because they lacked the political support required to win
legislative battles, they virtually guaranteed that the political
support necessary to protect legal victories would be missing. Like
the Weathermen, who Alinsky suggested should be "paid by the
extreme right for the work they do,"'139 same-sex marriage
litigators inspired and mobilized their opponents to an
unprecedented degree. In so doing, they created numerous
statutory and constitutional barriers to same-sex marriage that
did not exist before the successes of the litigation campaign.
Today, in order to win marriage equality, the federal DOMA and
laws in forty states must be repealed, and thirty state
constitutions must be amended. Doing so will likely take a
generation or more. This is the cost that same-sex marriage
proponents must now pay for violating Alinsky's rules for radicals.
Proponents of litigation to win the right to same-sex marriage
will undoubtedly protest this harsh assessment. They might
argue, for example, that no one could have foreseen the extent of
the conservative reaction to judicial victories. While this might
conceivably have been the case prior to the Hawaii litigation, after
the passage of DOMA in 1996 and similar legislation in dozens of
states, litigators were on notice that any judicial victory would be
met with a powerful and effective legislative opposition. Even
before the Hawaii litigation, readers of Alinsky's 140 or my work 141
ought to have been wary of litigation. To continue to have pressed
the litigation campaign forward is simply incomprehensible.
A second response to my harsh critique is to claim that
although there has been an unfortunate backlash, litigation has
accomplished a great deal. For example, as discussed above, in
eleven states and the District of Columbia same-sex couples have
more rights today than they did before the litigation campaign. 42
137. Adam Nagourney, 'Moral Values' Carried Bush, Rove Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2004, at 20.
138. HORWITT, supra note 1, at 528.
139. Id.
140. See generally ALINSKY, supra note 7 (implicitly criticizing the reliance
on litigation for rights by not advocating it).
141. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 44 (explicitly criticizing the
reliance on litigation for rights).
142. See supra Part II (documenting the gains from the litigation campaign
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Further, litigation supporters might suggest that litigation
brought the issue of same-sex marriage to the public agenda. The
issue is now discussed and debated in a way that was not
happening before the litigation. In addition, they might claim that
it has increased public support for same-sex marriage in particular
and gay rights more generally. Are these claims defensible?
It is, of course, true that in a few states gay men, lesbians,
and their partners have greater rights than they did before the
litigation campaign started. But these have been gained at an
enormous cost to gays everywhere else. Unless one happens to live
in one of those places, it is now harder to gain marriage equality.
It is hard to celebrate the benefits of the few when they are borne
by the costs of the many.
As for media coverage, it does appear that same-sex marriage
receives more media coverage than previously. Analysis of the
Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature and the New York Times
shows that over the period 1980-2004 the issue of same-sex
marriage has received increasing media attention. 143 Nonetheless,
the temporal distribution of that attention suggests that it is
largely driven by opposition to same-sex marriage, not litigation in
support of it.144 Nearly seventy percent of the coverage in the New
York Times over the twenty-five year period studied occurred in
only the three presidential election years of 1996, 2000, and
2004.145 Further, content analysis of New York Times entries
shows that the coverage of same-sex marriage is substantially
more negative than positive. 146 It is hard to see how media
coverage of your opponents furthers your cause.
Has litigation increased public support for same-sex
marriage? Overall, it is hard to make a strong case that litigation
in support of same-sex marriage has substantially increased
support for it.147 For the most part, support for same-sex marriage
has been increasing slowly with much of the change occurring
before the Goodridge decision. 148 As for civil unions, in the years
following Goodridge, approximately one-half of the American
public was in support. 149 "This represents an increase of about ten
percentage points since 2000 and somewhat more since the mid-
for same-sex couples' rights).





147. See id. at 400-07 and accompanying text (discussing public opinion on
same-sex marriage).
148. See id. at 404 (arguing that the Goodridge decision does not seem to
have increased public support for same-sex marriage).
149. Id. at 406.
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1990s."150 Public "[s]upport for civil unions is higher than support
for same-sex marriage and civil unions are almost always the
preferred position when respondents are asked to chose between
them."15 1 While this may be a response to litigation, it more likely
is a reflection of the changes in societal views of gay rights,
discussed below.
A third response to the critique of litigation is that
proponents of same-sex marriage had no other alternatives. This
view shows a poverty of imagination that would infuriate Alinsky.
Strategies for change are not limited to either legislation or
litigation. There is a wealth of social change tactics that gay
rights groups have used with some success on other issues. These
include everything from guerilla theater to films and television to
political advertising. The gay community has no less of a share of
creative people than other communities. But because the quest for
same-sex marriage was taken over by lawyers, creativity was lost.
IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
It is not hard to imagine a different strategy to win the right
to marriage equality. It is premised on Alinsky's belief that
change requires public support. For better or worse, most
Americans see themselves as "middle class," average Janes and
Joes. For change to be effective, at the very least it must have the
acquiescence, if not the support, of these people. On the next-to-
the-last page of Rules for Radicals, Ainsky writes, "Tactics must
begin with the experience of the middle class ... ."152 For the
Alinsky-educated same-sex marriage proponent, this may be good
news. This is because over the last several decades there has been
a dramatic change in societal acceptance of gay men and lesbians.
Strategies based on this change have a chance to succeed.
The extent of change can be seen in many arenas, ranging
from public opinion surveys to employment to television and movie
treatment to societal understandings more broadly. 53  While
discrimination still exists, it has diminished. Reviewing public
opinion data in 2004, Karlyn Bowman finds an "enormous increase
in tolerance" for gays over the last several decades. 54 The data
show that since the 1970s the American public has become
increasingly more accepting of and comfortable with the
150. Id. at 407.
151. Id.
152. ALINSKY, supra note 7, at 195.
153. See ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at 407-15 (noting the cultural changes
in views about gays).
154. James Ricci & Patricia Ward Biederman, Acceptance of Gays on Rise,
Polls Show, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, § B, at 1, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/mar/3Olocal/me-change30.
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participation of gay men and lesbians throughout society.
155
Perhaps more importantly, the data show that younger people are
the strongest supporters of gay rights. 156 For example, polls show
that in 1997, several years before the Vermont and Massachusetts
cases, half of college freshmen supported same-sex marriage.
157
By 2002, support had increased to fifty-nine percent. 158 And a
2001 national survey of 1,000 high school seniors reported even
greater support (sixty-six percent) for same-sex marriage. 159
These polls suggest that support for same-sex marriage is likely to
grow over time. As Evan Wolfson, executive director of Freedom to
Marry, somewhat mischievously put it, "we have a secret weapon:
death."160
Growing support for same-sex marriage is not unique to the
United States. 161 There is a worldwide movement for change.
"The Netherlands legalized same-sex marriage in 2001, followed
by Belgium in 2003, most Canadian provinces between 2003 and
2005, Spain and Canada as a whole in 2005, South Africa in
2006,"162 and Norway in 2008.163 In addition, approximately
twenty countries permit same-sex civil unions as do several cities
such as Buenos Aires, Argentina, and Mexico City, Mexico.1
64
Changes in public opinion in the U.S. towards same-sex
marriage, and around the world, are primarily the result of
changing cultures. It is likely that changing cultural
understandings have provided much of the support for civil unions
and same-sex marriage. And if these trends continue, as the data
suggest they will, it is possible, if not likely, that over time support
for same-sex marriage will increase sufficiently to make it
politically feasible to enact. This makes it all the more tragic that
litigation became the main strategy of same-sex marriage
proponents. By litigating for same-sex marriage before the
majority was ready for it, litigators moved too fast and too far
ahead of Alinsky's middle class, inevitably creating backlash. The
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. KARLYN BOWMAN & BRYAN O'KEEFE, ATTITUDES ABOUT
HOMOSEXUALITY & GAY MARRIAGE 23 (2004), available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050520_HOMOSEXUALITY0520.pdf.
158. Id. at 23.
159. Ricci & Biederman, supra note 154.
160. Evan Wolfson, Marriage Equality and Some Lessons for the Scary Work
of Winning, Address to the Nat'l. Lesbian & Gay Law Ass'n. "Lavender Law"
Conference (Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.freedomtomarry.org
/pdfs/Scarywork.pdf.
161. ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at 415.
162. Id.
163. Catherine Stein, Same Sex Marriage Law Passed by Wide Majority,
AFTENPOSTEN (Norway), June 12, 2008, http://www.aftenposten.no/english
/local/article2479146.ece.
164. ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at 415.
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executive director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force,
Matt Foreman, acknowledged this after the 2004 election where
eleven constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage
were adopted: "there is no putting lipstick on this pig .... Our
legal strategy is at least 10 years ahead of our political and
legislative strategy."165  The result of litigation under such
conditions has set back the movement rather than produced
positive change.
The lack of sufficient political support to turn judicial
pronouncements into political reality is well illustrated by
considering the exuberant reaction of same-sex litigator Evan
Wolfson to the Hawaii decision noted earlier. In comparing it to
Loving v. Virginia, Wolfson inadvertently highlights the many
ways in which same-sex marriage legal victories are radically
different. For example, it was the Supreme Court of the United
States that struck down anti-miscegenation laws in Loving, while
the first three same-sex marriage victories came from two of the
smallest and least representative states of the union (Hawaii and
Vermont) and one of the most liberal ones (Massachusetts). More
importantly, when the Supreme Court decided Loving, only
sixteen states banned inter-racial marriages while at the time of
Baehr, Baker, and Goodridge no state permitted same-sex
marriages. In addition, Loving was preceded by the passage of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, prohibiting race-based discrimination in
employment and accommodations. 166 There has been no such
major national legislation prohibiting discrimination against gays
and lesbians. Wolfson's comparison shows how dramatically
different the conditions were between Loving and the same-sex
marriage cases. They underline how bringing the Loving case
made sense while litigating for the right to same-sex marriage did
not.
As Alinsky would no doubt argue, different conditions require
different strategies. By assuming that litigation would produce a
right for all seasons, same-sex marriage litigators sparked a
powerful opposition. Indeed, perhaps the most fascinating result
of the litigation has been the stunningly successful counter-
mobilization against same-sex marriage. I have found such a
pattern before in cases like Brown and Roe where the losers in
court mobilized and effectively stymied change. 167 One of the most
important lessons, then, that comes from litigation for marriage
165. Adam Liptak, Caution in Court for Gay Rights Groups, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2004, at 16, available at
http://query.nytimes.comlgstlfullpage.html?res=9A06E6DE163FF931A25752C
1A9629C8B63.
166. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, Title VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253
(codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17).
167. ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at chs. 4 and 6.
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equality is that litigation on behalf of the relatively disadvantaged,
if successful, is likely to be met with powerful political resistance.
Thus, the political insulation of the judiciary, the very attribute
that allows the relatively disadvantaged to have their day in court,
also limits the efficacy of judicial victories. It is a sad catch-22
situation that proponents of issues like same-sex marriage face.
What, then, should proponents of same-sex marriage have
done? While hindsight is twenty-twenty, building on the cultural
changes taking place would have made sense. For example, as
Americans have become more accepting of gay men and lesbians, it
is likely that they have become more sensitive to issues of
discrimination and fairness. A same-sex marriage campaign
based on these notions might have made headway. Instead of
litigating, what if same-sex marriage advocates had launched an
advertising campaign featuring famous athletes, who happen to be
gay, speaking about how unfair it is that they are not allowed to
marry their partners? Imagine a Super Bowl ad, with a clip of
some great play made in an earlier Super Bowl. The player might
talk about how proud he is to have played in a Super Bowl and
have made that play. Perhaps he could turn to his partner and
talk about how proud he is of their relationship. Then, he could
point out that although he and his partner love each other very
much and have been together for a number of years, they are not
allowed to marry. The advertisement might end with the athlete
looking directly into the camera, asking, "is that fair?" I am not an
advertising agent, so perhaps this is not a good idea. But my point
is that strategies that build upon deepening understandings have
a much better chance of success than those that do not.
If, however, proponents insisted on litigation, they would
have done well to remember Alinsky's admonition that "to the
organizer, compromise is a key and beautiful word."168  This
suggests that rather than litigating for same-sex marriage,
proponents would have been wiser to litigate for greater benefits
for same-sex couples. Such an incremental strategy builds on
American's growing support for full participation for gay men and
lesbians and would have been less likely to arouse intense
opposition and more likely to succeed. There is an example that
same-sex marriage proponents might have followed-the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"). In
attacking racial segregation, the NAACP did not, initially, directly
challenge the separate-but-equal standard. 169 Although its goal
168. ALINSKY, supra note 7, at 59.
169. ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at 417. See generally RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S
LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987)
(examining the history of the legal fight against public school segregation and
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was to end legal segregation, it understood that neither the courts
nor the country were ready to dismantle it.170 Instead, NAACP
litigators worked incrementally, accepting the separate-but-equal
standard and arguing that defendants were not providing
equality.' 7' As painful as this must have been to NAACP
litigators, they followed the strategy for several decades, winning
numerous cases. 172 Only then, were they ready to challenge the
separate-but-equal doctrine itself. By analogy, if same-sex
marriage proponents had the patience, discipline, and
understanding of the NAACP, they might have won more by
asking for less. 173
I suspect that many supporters of same-sex marriage would
be frustrated by this strategy. "How can you ask us," they might
say, "to litigate for second-class status when gay men and lesbians
are entitled to equal treatment and benefits?" The response is
that the battle for same-sex marriage is not only about the rhetoric
of rights but also about the reality of political power. The most
poignant and powerful rights claims will fail without political
support. And until that political support is present, litigation is
likely to produce backlash.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the failure of litigation to win the right to same-
sex marriage highlights Alinsky's most basic insights about how to
bring about change. Almost every aspect of the structure and
procedure of litigation mitigates against effective organizing and
mobilization. In turning to courts, proponents of marriage
equality confused the rhetoric of rights with the reality of reaction.
To continue to litigate after 1996, when it was clear that any
further litigation victories would produce continued backlash, was
pure folly. The "lure of litigation" misled same-sex marriage
litigators to move faster and farther than the American public was
ready to go. When they won, they were unsurprisingly met with
major opposition. The lesson here is a simple one-those who rely
on the courts absent significant public and political support will
fail to achieve meaningful social change and may set their cause
back.
For Saul Alinksy, there was no substitute for political action.
As long as many of the brightest and most idealistic young people
exploring the NAACP's litigation strategy). See generally Robert L. Carter,
The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 86 MICH. L. REV.
1083 (1988) (reviewing Tushnet's book from the perspective of one of the
NAACP's litigators at the time and criticizing some of Tushnet's assertions).
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embark on legal careers and look to legal strategies to produce
change, that change is unlikely to be achieved. Alinsky taught
that community organizing and political mobilization may not be
glamorous or pay six-figure salaries, but they are the best if not
the only hope to produce change-not as a fallback position, not as
a complement to a legal strategy, but as the strategy itself. Same-
sex marriage activists had a choice about how to further their
cause. In ignoring Alinsky's experience and arguments and
choosing to litigate, they created additional barriers to the
achievement of their goal of marriage equality. Alinsky would not
be surprised.
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